Events

PEGFA Research Seminars 2024: Coronado Arciniegas & Mohamed

27th Feb 2024 1pm - 2:30pm

Greenwich Campus

SL007

The Institute of Political Economy, Governance, Finance and Accountability invites you to its Research Seminar Series 2024.

The third seminar will feature PEGFA experts Jose Alejandro Coronado Arciniegas and Menatulla Mohamed.

The MS Teams meeting can be accessed here.

Jose Alejandro Coronado Arciniegas will talk about "Information-Constrained Models for Ultimatum Bargaining".

"We argue for the use of the principle of maximum entropy to better predict behavior in experimental economics and use the ultimatum game as a case study. The Logit equilibrium can be derived by maximizing Shannon's informational entropy subject to behavioral constraints. This provides an effective way to translate behavioral hypotheses into theoretical distributions that are candidates to characterize empirical frequencies when performing experiments. We develop multiple candidate behavioral models for the joint distribution of offers and acceptance rates. We train the models using a database containing observed interactions of simple ultimatum game experiments conducted by Henrich et al. (2004), and Ensminger & Henrich (2014).
The experiments conducted by Henrich et al., and Ensminger & Henrich consists of ultimatum experiments performed around the world on small scale societies. We extend our models to consider variations in offers and acceptance rates across different types of societies measured by their integration to markets, complexity, population size, and payoffs to cooperation. We further relax the common knowledge assumption in the QRE literature by making proposers approximate the acceptance distribution by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence. In line with the literature, the model that performs better at predicting the observed patterns has a responder rejecting low offers and the proposer offering an equal split in anticipation."

Menatulla Mohamed will be discussing "The impact of non-executive female directors on CSR decoupling".

"This study examines the relationship between female non-executive directors and CSR decoupling in UK firms. CSR decoupling occurs when there is a disparity between a firm’s CSR activities and its disclosure. We argue that female non-executive directors significantly enhance board monitoring functions, decision-making processes, and stakeholder engagement, leading to more authentic and effective CSR practices and lower CSR decoupling. Utilising a sample from the FTSE 350 index spanning 2012 to 2019, our analysis reveals a significant negative relationship between the proportion of female non-executive directors and CSR decoupling. This indicates that greater female representation on boards is associated with a lower CSR decoupling. This trend persists across various industries, with a 'critical mass' of female directors amplifying this positive effect. Our findings suggest that regulators and policymakers should consider the role of board composition in CSR activities and use CSR decoupling as a metric for evaluating CSR effectiveness. This study contributes to the ongoing discussion on non-financial reporting and transparency in corporate practices and enriches the broader CSR literature by highlighting the unique impact of gender diversity at the board level."

We look forward to seeing you there!

Please find the entire programme for this year's Research Seminar Series here.